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A strong tradition exists in the dev<'>.lopment literatur,:-; of viewing LDC probl,,ms as being primarily supply problems. Demand considerations are rarely emphasized except in discussions of the foreign sector (foreign exchange gaps) and of the trend in output composition (income elasticities of demand). Lewis (1) , in discarding neo-elassical approaches in favour of a return to classical principles, finds that "from the point of view of countries with surplus labour, Keynesianism is only a footnote to neoclassicism. , , ." Those economists (2) who have explicitly considered the applicability of demand policies to LDC problems in greater' detail have been similarly skeptical, The main thesis, expressed in (3), has been • • . that although there is abundant labour, at least of unskilled types, a general increase in demand will not lead to a general increase in output, because other "co-operating factors" are needed to work with labour, The traditional one to take is capital --i. e,, real capital equipment; nothing much can be done with bare hands alone, While this hypothesis of a low output-investment multiplier is often qualified, it remains the basis for a rejection of demand oriented cures for LDC unemployment. Attention is therefore directed to the need for capital accumulation, especially in labour intensive forms, as the corrective· for the capital shortage induced unemployment.
Todaro (4) has presented a model of LDC urban unemployment which relates unemployment to the existence of an urban-rural wage gap. His formulation assumes, rather than explains, the existence of this wage differential. Unemployment is then explained by postulating that the level of unemployment, through its influence on the probability of obtaining an urban job, is such as to equate the expected urban wage with the rural wage.
In our model, the wage differential is determined by the level of Output in each sector is determined by a short-run production function. The constant factor in the rural sector is land, that in the urban sector is the stock of capital equipment. Thus:
Competiti~e conditions are assumed to prevail in the urban sector.
._ .
-4-Profit maximising behaviour establishes the equality of the urban wage and the short-run marginal product of labour in manufacturing: (3) Agricultural production is undertaken by peasant proprietors. It is assumed that the implicit rural wage is given by the average product in agriculture: 1 • (4) Equality of the rural wage and the expected urban wage is given by: ( 5) where (1-u) is taken as the probability of obtaining an urban job in conformity with the Todaro for;mulation.
Labour balance is given by:
where L is the total labour force, assumed to be constant.
Savings activity is assumed to be undertaken exclusively by urban 2 capitalists, who save the whole of their profits: 1 ·Alternative models of rural wage determination include equality of the rural wage and the marginal product of labour in agriculture, and the hYPothesis of a constant institutional wage in agriculture. Substitution of either of these formulations for the average product hYPothesis does not alter the basic properties of the model developed in equations (1) -(10).
2 ·A formulation of this nature is only adopted for simplicity. Explicit -5-
Investment activity is also undertaken only by urban capitalists.
The immediate stimulus to investment is the expectation of profits. A myriad of factors determine the expected profitability of investments in LDC's; the rate of interest is only a sub-ordinate consideration. one which is similar to that of Hirschman (6) , is that there are no automatic forces which ensura the ~ ante equality of savings and investment.
The level of investment in any short period may thus be taken as given:
In equilibrium, savings must equal investment:
consideration of self-contained savings-investment activity in the rural sector (~·ll· peasant contruction of irrigation wells) does not alter the relationship between capitalists' saving and investment developed in equations (7) -(9).
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I = S (9)
The economy is assumed to be a small open economy with relative prices given by the world market:
Equations (1) - (10) provide a determinant system of ten equations in ten unknowns: A, M, I, S, I.mt La, U (or u), wm' Wa and P. The interpretation of the equilibrium generated by this system as a whole is easily presented through its relation to the usu.al formulation of the dual economy model. Setting U (and hence u) equal to zero in equations (5) and (6) to give equations (5)' and (6)•, and dropping equation (8) Now, if all remaining labour were employed in the rural sector, there is no reason for the rural -wage, as determined by (4), to equal ;w~.
FIGURE I
Assume that investment is deficient in the sense that I is less than the equilibrium level of savings as determined by the remnant model, 2:_._::. by 3. In the language of the absorption literature, unemployment is induced by a tendency for a country's saving capacity to exceed its absoption capacity at full employment. An important distinction among the programs derives from the extent to which they must be applied before unemployment is reduced. Some policies, regardless of the extent to which they are pursued, will always have an unambiguous impact on unemployment. In this class are foreign aid financed rural projects and tariff/export subsidies. to an increase in the agricultural labour force. On an assumption of con- (The case with o>O but falling unemployment is illustrated.) Intuitively, this ambiguity derives from the conflicting influences which a lower urban wage and higher urban employment have on the attractiveness of migration.
The net impact of these two factors is summarized in the parameter o.
This ambiguity is only relevant to small increase in investment.
There is always some level of investment sufficiently high to eliminate unemployment. Graphically, this result is illustrated by the unambiguous movement of the intercepts of the wa and E(Wfti) curves to~rd each other, a process that can be continued until the point of intersection of the two curves is at the intercepts. This convergence of the intercepts employed in the rural sector at the rural wage or in the urban sector at the manufacturing wage, the effect is to lower La at any level of U. The wa curve shifts up even further than it would for an increase in investment equal to the increase in government expenditure. This secondary effect on the rural wage ensures that the unemployment-government rural expenditure multiplier is unambiguously lower than the unemployment-investment multiplier. Government rural expenditure is always somewhat more likely to decrease unemployment than is investment.
In the case of urban sector expenditure, however, the E(~) curve is also shifted above the position it would occupy if investment, rather than government expenditure, were increased, This shift occurs because an increase in government urban employees increases the probability of ob- . .,. Various investment and government expenditure programs can be used to Aliminate unemployment. In practice, these policies will not be alternatives, but can be used in combination. If full advantage is to be taken of these policies, however, stress must be placed on careful project planning. Arbitrary expenditure will fail to benefit from the growth gains which unemployment reduction through increased investment can have, The presumption is that employment and growth can be complementary objectives.
A reduction in the discrimination against the rural sector can also be expected to lower unemployment. Import substitution policies which only elicit low levels of investment (and slow growth) despite greatly favouring savers are likely to be associated with high rates of unemployment.
Under the most pessimistic assumptions, !·~· M' =A' = o, no policy can secure an increase in output consequent on a reduction in unemployment.
In this case, labour is redundant in both sectors. Unemployment policies merely substitute rural disguised unemployment for urban open employment.
Of course, urban social and political problems associated with open unemployment may make even this trade-off of considerable interest. Except under improbable assumptions of this nature, a successful unemployment policy will increase output. And, as already emphasized, some pessimism over the increased output deriving from increased urban sector employment makes for optimism regarding the ease with which unemployment can be reduced.
